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Abstract 
 
This paper traces the evolution of philanthropic involvement in developing country 
agriculture from the ‘scientific philanthropy’ of the Rockefeller Foundation during and 
after the Green Revolution era to the ‘philathrocapitalism’ of the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, by examining two cases of ‘pro-poor’ agricultural biotechnology research: 
pro-Vitamin A-enriched ‘Golden Rice’ and drought tolerant maize. In each case, novel 
institutions developed for technology transfer have created conditions conducive to 
future capitalist accumulation in ways that are not immediately obvious. These 
initiatives can be understood as institutional experiments that are shifting debates about 
the governance and regulation of genetically modified (‘GM’) crops. Meanwhile an 
emphasis on silver bullet solutions and institutions that ‘connect to the market’ diverts 
attention from more context-responsive approaches. This trend is likely to intensify with 
the announcement at the recent G8 summit backing a ‘New Alliance for Food Security 
and Nutrition’ in which agri-business corporations are to play a key role. 
 
 
 
Introduction – philanthropy, biotechnology, development 
The relationship between US-based philanthropic foundations and developing country agriculture 
has a seventy-year history. In 1943 the Rockefeller Foundation facilitated a US-Mexico agricultural 
development co-operation programme, which would later become the template for an international 
network of international agricultural research centres known today as the CGIAR (Consultative 
Group on International Agricultural Research2) system (Perkins, 1997). However, it was with the 
creation of crop research centres such as the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) in the 1960s, that an intervention 
model - which identified increased production, or yield, as the overriding goal and genetics-led crop 
improvement as the solution - became firmly established (Anderson et al, 1991). 
 
The mode of overseas development assistance pioneered by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations 
during the ‘Green Revolution’ era continued in the tradition of ‘scientific philanthropy’, which sets 
                                                
1 This paper is a pre-publication version of Brooks, S. (forthcoming) Philanthrocapitalism, ’pro-poor’ agricultural 
biotechnology and development, in B. Morvaridi (Ed.) New Philanthropy and Social Justice, Policy Press: Bristol. 
 
2 This term more accurately refers to the donor group that supports the network of research institutions. However in 
everyday parlance ‘the CGIAR’ and ‘the CGIAR system’ refers to the network of research centres. 
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out to address ‘causes’ rather than symptoms of poverty -, as long as these can be addressed by 
science or education rather than major structural or societal change (Carnegie, 1889). Against the 
backdrop of the Cold War, for the US Government and its allies the core aim of the Green 
Revolution was to avert a ‘red’ revolution in Asia. In this context, the emphasis on a Green 
Revolution ‘signal[ed] like a flag, that social change was not necessary, since the technical means in 
agriculture (evoked by “green”) alone were supposed to solve the problem of hunger’ (Spitz, 
1987:56). Thus, framing of the problem to be solved as one of production, not income, deftly 
steered the debate away from socio-economic concerns and towards technical ones; while the 
identification of a solution embedded ‘in the seed’, with built in scalability, preempted discussion of 
issues of distribution and inequality (Anderson et al, 1991; Cullather, 2004). 
 
The socio-economic and environmental consequences of the Green Revolution have been 
extensively debated over the years (Pearse, 1980; Griffin, 1979; Glaeser, 1987; Lipton & 
Longhurst, 1989; David & Otsuka, 1993). Moreover, while primarily a public sector effort, there is 
no doubt that the widespread adoption, during the Green Revolution, of ‘improved’ seeds, chemical 
inputs and farm mechanisation served to open up developing country agriculture to capitalist 
investment (Cullather, 2004; Morvaridi, 2012b). In this context, the role of private philanthropy was 
understood as an intermediary one, positioned between the ‘public’ and ‘private’, acting to ‘correct 
for’ the market and ensure the new technologies qualified as ‘public goods’.  
 
In contrast, contemporary ‘philanthrocapitalists,’ such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(BMGF), see their role as bringing business principles to the development sector; ‘extending 
leverage’ through links with the private sector and so achieving ‘impact at scale’ (Edwards 2008). 
Rather than ‘correct for’ the market, they seek to ‘connect to’ the market (Brooks et al, 2009a; 
Brooks, 2011). This paper illustrates this transition from scientific philanthropy to 
philanthrocapitalism through two case studies: firstly, the two decades-long ‘Golden Rice’ project 
which has bridged the two eras; and secondly, a more recent programme aiming to develop and 
commercialise drought tolerant maize varieties in Sub Saharan Africa, whose design has drawn 
selectively on these early lessons. 
 
Comparison of the ‘logic model’ (Frumkin 2006) informing these ventures highlights both 
disjunctures and continuities in terms of the theory of change and notions of scale and leverage that 
have informed their design. Firstly, the belief in the inherent scalability of a solution based on 
genetics-led crop improvement remains unshaken, despite a professed shift in focus to the needs of 
smallholder farmers. Secondly, a theory of change combines the familiar ‘technical fix’ with a 
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‘market fix’ that would integrate smallholder farmers into commercial value chains.  Thirdly, this 
change model relies on a transformed understanding of leverage as ‘connecting to’ rather than 
‘correcting for’ the market in the provision of public goods.  
 
Fourthly, a focus on institutional challenges and innovations highlights as a key element of 
continuity the inseparability of questions of philanthropic ‘giving’ and capitalist accumulation. In 
each of the initiatives explored in this paper, novel institutions developed for technology transfer 
and development assistance have served to prepare the ground for future accumulation in ways that 
may not be immediately obvious. In this context, these initiatives can be seen as institutional 
experiments that are already shifting debates about genetically modified (‘GM’) crops and their 
regulation – reframing questions of ‘access’ to technology in terms that valorize corporate ‘donors’ 
of proprietary technologies and bolstering the case for industry-friendly technology regulatory 
frameworks. Meanwhile an emphasis on silver bullet solutions and institutions that ‘connect to the 
market’ is diverting attention away from the multiplicity of alternative approaches that respond to 
the conditions, needs and practices that constitute smallholder agriculture in diverse locations. 
 
Bridging ‘old’ and ‘new’ Philanthropy: the case of Golden Rice  
In the early 1990s, scientists based at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) secured 
funding from the International Program on Rice Biotechnology (IPRB), a programme established in 
the 1980s by the Rockefeller Foundation to support the development of biotechnology capacity and 
applications oriented to developing country needs and priorities (Evenson et al, 1996). While the 
majority of projects funded addressed, either directly or indirectly, the problem of yield, funding 
was also allocated to a project that sought to ‘genetically engineer the pro-vitamin A pathway into 
the rice endosperm’ (Potrykus, 2001). The justification for funding this research was that, while the 
likelihood of success was considered to be low, the potential benefits in public health terms would 
be significant, given that vitamin A deficiency was a priority concern for the international nutrition 
community (Mason et al, 2001). When the scientists achieved the transformation in their laboratory 
in Zurich in 1999, on the eve of the closure of the IPRB, the project was hailed as the IPRB’s 
‘greatest achievement’ (Normile, 1999). 
 
In 2001 a lead article in Time magazine announced the discovery of what had become known as 
‘Golden Rice’ with the assertion: ‘this rice could save a million kids a year’ (Nash, 2001). The 
article confirmed the project’s status as ‘poster child’ in an increasingly polarised GM crop debate, 
as claims made for a technology still in the lab attracted contestation and controversy (Nestle, 2001, 
BIOTHAI et al, 2001). A significant and less well understood dimension of the controversy was the 
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transfer of the outputs of what had been public sector research, financed by governmental as well as 
philanthropic funding, to a private company, Syngenta, in exchange for assistance in negotiating 
unanticipated intellectual property restrictions; intensifying suspicion that Golden Rice would serve 
as a ‘Trojan Horse’ to gain public acceptance of GM crops more generally (Pollan, 2001). The 
inventors and their new sponsors, on the other hand, drew attention to the creation of a ‘new type of 
public private partnership,’ which would allow the free transfer of proprietary technology to public 
research institutions in developing countries able to adapt and disseminate the new, nutrient-dense 
varieties to resource poor farmers (Potrykus, 2001). 
 
In 2002, Golden Rice materials were transferred to the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)3 
in the Philippines. A ‘Humanitarian Board’, initially comprising the Golden Rice inventors and 
donors and a Syngenta representative, had issued a ‘humanitarian license’ enabling IRRI and 
selected regional partners to begin the time consuming, and far less glamorous task of ‘back-
crossing’ the Golden Rice ‘trait’ into indica varieties, using conventional plant breeding techniques. 
Ingo Potrykus and his colleagues at ETH had succeeded in transferring a gene containing beta-
carotene, a precursor of vitamin A, into a japonica rice variety, which grows in temperate zones. 
Populations targeted by the Golden Rice project live in tropical environments, where indica 
varieties predominate. In parallel with this adaptive research at IRRI, scientists at Syngenta 
continued to work on japonica materials, and were twice successful in increasing the beta-carotene 
level in the grain (as well as removing the selectable marker gene) - prompting IRRI and its partners 
to discard the results of earlier adaptive research and start again with the newly donated japonica 
materials. The research continued, in a far from linear fashion, over several years, until, in 2008, 
IRRI scientists stablised germplasm ready for open field trials and preliminary nutrition studies 
(Brooks, 2010; Al-Babili & Beyer, 2005).  
 
The BMGF began co-funding Golden Rice research in 2003, channeling funds through two major 
new initiatives, the CGIAR HarvestPlus Biofortification Program (HarvestPlus, 2004) and, under its 
‘Grand Challenges for Global Health’ initiative, the ‘ProVitaMinRice’ Consortium - created to 
extend Golden Rice research to the development of rice enriched with multiple nutrients (BMGF, 
2003). In their design, both programmes emphasised a genetic-led research approach which, it was 
envisaged, would have a large scale impact on micronutrient malnutrition across the developing 
world – part of a centralised vision that equated biofortification (an umbrella term for 
micronutrient-dense staple crops) with water fluoration: ‘The [required nutrients] will get into the 
food system much like we put fluoride in the water system. It will be invisible, but it will be there to 
                                                
3 IRRI is the CGIAR international crop research centre whose mandate focuses on rice research. 
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increase intakes’ (Bouis 2004). Here elements of continuity can be found with the scientific 
philanthropy of Carnegie, Rockefeller and Ford, in the attraction of ‘silver bullet’ solutions - 
technical, generic and inherently scalable - repackaged in the context of a contemporary target 
culture as a ‘Grand Challenge’ (Brooks et al, 2009a). Despite the lack of evidence at the time as to 
the effectiveness, or even the efficacy, of biofortification, the BMGF took a ‘leap of faith’ in 
committing substantial funding to a suite of biofortification initiatives, including Golden Rice 
(Brooks, 2010). 
 
In 2011 the BMGF announced nearly $20 million in new grants for biofortification projects; 
including funds to ‘help in the development, testing and marketing of Golden Rice’ (Nayer 2011). 
Since then, the Philippines Rice Research Institute (PhilRice), in cooperation with IRRI, has carried 
out two seasons of field trials, which concluded in early 2013 (PhilRice, 2013). Meanwhile, the 
findings of a nutrition study carried out with a group of healthy children in controlled conditions 
have been published (Tang et al., 2012)4. With the field trials and preliminary nutrition studies 
completed, community nutrition studies to ascertain whether Golden Rice will indeed prove 
effective as an antidote to vitamin A deficiency in malnourished populations in ‘real world’ settings 
are now underway; overseen by a new project partner, Helen Keller International. These studies, 
together with further post harvest research and preparation for regulatory assessment, ‘will take two 
years or more’, according to a recent clarifying statement from IRRI (IRRI 2013).  
 
Nevertheless, a consistent theme running through Golden Rice project communications has been an 
emphasis on institutional constraints and achievements, which has diverted attention from the 
faltering progress of the research itself (Brooks, 2010). The celebration of the project as a ‘new type 
of public private partnership’ through which the inventors had secured assistance from Syngenta in 
negotiating the ‘frightening number’ of patents and material transfer agreements (MTAs) (Potrykus, 
2001) is a case in point. In fact, this solution had been one of a range of options set out in a 
Rockefeller Foundation-commissioned ‘freedom to operate’ study which, interestingly, had drawn 
attention to the inapplicability of many of the patents in the countries targeted by the project 
(Kryder et al., 2000; Hindmarsh and Hindmarsh, 2002; Brooks, 2010). In the event, settlement on 
the ‘humanitarian use’ option preempted exploration of these alternative options. The agreement 
generated series of new institutions; a ‘humanitarian license’, to allow the technology to be 
‘donated’ by Syngenta, free of charge, to public research institutions and ultimately to farmers 
whose income was below a set level ($10,000 per annum); a ‘Humanitarian Board’ to oversee the 
use of the license; and a ‘Golden Rice Network’ of public research bodies, coordinated by IRRI (as 
                                                
4 Nevertheless, ethical concerns surrounding the study have generated further controversy (Enserink, M. (2013)). 
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‘technology holder’) and including several of its  ‘traditional’ regional partners, though on markedly 
different terms (Brooks, 2010). 
 
Juxtaposed against the success story of the institutionalisation of the ‘humanitarian use’ principle 
was a more negative story about the regulatory hurdles standing between the Golden Rice 
technology and its projected beneficiaries. Here the Golden Rice trajectory intersected with the 
contested politics of biosafety regulation, particularly in the developing world, where it has become 
the focus of broader public debates about GM technology and development - largely because it is 
one of the few remaining spaces where such debate can still take place (Van Zwanenberg et al, 
2011). In this context, Golden Rice has been afforded a very different, ‘virtual’ identity in policy 
and public discourse, as a potent symbol of the thwarted promise of GM crops (Brooks, 2013). In 
contrast to its messy material reality as experimental material in the laboratory and greenhouse, 
Golden Rice was reconstructed as a proven technology and all but finished product, which, but for 
unnecessarily burdensome regulation and irrational opposition, would already be in farmers’ fields 
and saving lives (Potrykus, 2010 & 2012; see also McVie, 2013, Taverne, 2007). Some have even 
have gone so far as to state that regulatory ‘hurdles’ slowing down the dissemination of a life-
saving technology constitute ‘a crime against humanity’ (Potrykus, 2010: 466).  
 
The dynamics and consequences, for downstream ‘users’, of a complex research trajectory, in 
which a range of scientific and policy uncertainties have been shielded from view, have been 
explored in depth elsewhere (Brooks, 2010, 2011 & 2013). Crucially, fundamental questions 
regarding the efficacy and safety of Golden Rice, both as a commercial rice variety and solution to 
vitamin A deficiency have yet to be unanswered. Nonetheless, as an institutional experiment in 
conditional intellectual property transfer, the institutional arrangements surrounding the Golden 
Rice project, which embed a particular model of technology transfer, have served as a template for 
the development of a more refined, and, thus far, less contentious partnership - the Nairobi-based 
African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF).  
 
Model partnerships? 
Drought tolerant maize is the Holy Grail for agricultural research in Sub Saharan Africa (Brooks et 
al, 2009b). Breeding maize varieties for drought conditions has been a research priority in Sub 
Saharan Africa for many years, beginning with early maturing ‘drought escaping’ varieties 
developed in the 1960s and 1970s (Heisey & Edmeades, 1999). From the 1980s onwards, the 
development of drought tolerant (as opposed to drought escaping) varieties became a priority for the 
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International Centre for Improvement of Maize and Wheat (CIMMYT)5 and in the 1990s scientists 
at CIMMYT’s base in Zimbabwe developed a plant breeding methodology which represented an 
important departure from the approach - up to that point entrenched within the CGIAR - of 
developing elite lines in ‘optimal conditions’. Researchers in CIMMYT’s ‘Southern African 
Drought and Low Soil Fertility’ (SADLF) project piloted a new breeding technology for a range of 
‘managed stress conditions’, including - but not confined to - drought conditions, under what has 
been referred to as ‘Africa’s new smallholder maize paradigm’ (McCann et al, 2007). This 
methodology was implemented on a wider scale under the ‘African Maize Stress’ (AMS) project 
(Banziger & Diallo, 2000); a project that was also innovative in other ways, for example in piloting 
the ‘mother-baby’ model that invited an albeit limited degree of farmer participation in technology 
development (de Groote & Siambi, 2005; Sawkins et al, 2006).  
 
In the early 2000s, two parallel research initiatives were funded by the BMGF. The first was the 
CGIAR-led programme ‘Drought Tolerant Maize for Africa (DTMA)’ and the other - headed by the 
newly established public private partnership, the African Agricultural Technology Foundation 
(AATF) - was entitled ‘Water Efficient Maize for Africa (WEMA)’. Their aim was to tackle the 
problem of breeding maize for drought conditions. While employing the maize breeding 
methodology refined during the years of the SADLF and AMS projects, these new programmes 
differed from precursor initiatives in important ways - dispensing with the more context-sensitive 
and participatory aspects of the ‘smallholder paradigm’ that had been so positively evaluated 
(McCann et al, 2007). Firstly, both the DTMA and WEMA were framed as responses to the impacts 
of climate change on African agriculture, and focused specifically on the problem of drought, and 
not on the broader range of inter-related stresses and constraints faced by smallholder farmers as 
was formerly the case (Brooks et al, 2009b). Secondly, while precursor programmes had prioritised 
development of open pollinated varieties (OPVs), which allow farmers to save, exchange and 
replant seed from one year to the next, both DTMA and WEMA are designed around a package that 
includes newly developed hybrid maize varieties and commercial fertilizers. These were to be made 
available to farmers via a network of private providers, or agro-dealers, now cast as the de facto 
extension service in a model promoted under Africa’s new ‘Green Revolution’ – which was also the 
recipient of substantial funding from the BMGF (Odame & Muange, 2011). In this case, it was 
envisaged that a model, designed with Kenya’s high potential maize growing zones in Western 
Kenya and the Rift Valley in mind, would ‘trickle down’ to the precarious mixed farming systems 
found in drought-prone areas to the east of the country. At the same time, the participatory element 
in the earlier programmes was eclipsed by a recasting of ‘the farmer’ as a consumer of 
                                                
5 CIMMYT is the CGIAR international crop research centre whose mandate focuses on maize and wheat research. 
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predetermined technologies rather than as a partner in participatory technology development 
(Brooks et al, 2009b; Scoones and Thompson, 2011; cf. Ashby, 2009). 
 
The two programmes can be also contrasted with each other in important ways. Firstly, the DTMA 
programme is, as mentioned earlier, a public initiative, although (as in the case of HarvestPlus) the 
CGIAR centres co-ordinating the programme act as brokers in a research consortium that includes 
both public and private sector actors. The WEMA initiative, on the other hand, is headed by AATF, 
a public private partnership whose raison d’etre is to facilitate transfer of patented technologies and 
whose design owes much to lessons learned from institutional innovations around the Golden Rice 
project (Interview, Golden Rice Humanitarian Board member, 29 May 2006). Secondly, while 
DTMA (in common with HarvestPlus) emphasises conventional plant breeding, WEMA follows the 
example of the Golden Rice project in securing patented, transgenic materials ‘free of charge’ from 
a private company, Monsanto, for back-crossing into locally developed hybrid varieties. 
Interestingly, and again in common with HarvestPlus and Golden Rice, the DTMA and WEMA 
programmes are separate and distinct in theory but, in practice, intimately connected in multiple 
ways (see Brooks, 2010 and Brooks et al, 2009b for more extended discussion of these dynamics).  
 
Thus far WEMA (and the AATF) has avoided the controversy courted by the Golden Rice project. 
Firstly, the organisational image could not be more different. AATF presents itself very clearly as 
an African institution. Criticisms of the role of corporate interests and control, so heightened in 
Golden Rice debates, have been more muted, while managers of both WEMA and DTMA have 
been careful to manage expectations about when technologies can be expected to emerge from the 
pipeline (Brooks et al, 2009b). Nevertheless, the virtual identity of drought tolerant maize as a 
symbol of technological promise (cf. Glover, 2010) has made itself felt in debates surrounding the 
design of biosafety regulatory systems in Sub Saharan Africa. In this case, the use of WEMA 
project communications to advocate ‘science-based’ - read more permissive - biosafety regulation 
(WEMA, n.d.) suggests this is a role that has passed seamlessly from Golden Rice to the WEMA 
project. As concerns about the effects of climate change on African agriculture continue to escalate 
(Thornton et al, 2011; Vermeulen et al, 2011), the promise of drought tolerant maize in maize-
centred farming regions may, in the long run, prove to be a powerful lever in shaping regulatory 
instruments that are currently under development. Meanwhile, projects such as WEMA serve as an 
opportunity for continued experimentation and learning, by various actors, including the life 
sciences industry, in the conditional transfer of intellectual property rights and benefits. 
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‘Win-win solutions’ - or winners and losers? 
Debates about private philanthropy often separate the giving of money from the making of it. 
Drawing upon two examples of philanthropy in action, this paper has shown that the dividing line is 
not so easily drawn. Rather, the ways in which capital accumulation and philanthropy are 
interwoven is not always obvious. One of the advantages that private philanthropists have over 
other international development actors, governmental and nongovernmental, is their independence 
from short term incentives and pressures. Private foundations are uniquely able to take a long-term 
view and take risks. Decisions by the Rockefeller Foundation to found IRRI, the first institution of 
its kind (Anderson et al 1991), and to invest in the 15-year IPRB, which would lay the foundations 
for a global biotechnology research capacity in rice, are clear examples of this. Similarly, in the 
contemporary era, the BMGF has taken decisions to support, not only the development of new 
technologies, but also ‘new types of public private partnership’ - as exemplified by the Golden Rice 
project and AATF. Similarly, the BMGF has taken decisions to support, not only the development 
of new technologies, but also new types of public-private partnership. These partnerships can be 
seen as institutional experiments that are already shifting debates about GM crops and their 
regulation: reframing questions of ‘access’ to technology in terms that valorise the technology 
‘donor’; and advocating regulatory systems that ‘enable’ more rapid approval of new technologies. 
Meanwhile the single-minded pursuit of technological and institutional solutions that connect to the 
market - both ‘upstream’ in top-down modes of technology transfer, and ‘downstream’ in privatised 
seed delivery channels - detracts from alternative approaches more responsive to local realities. 
The Asian Green Revolution, launched with the support of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations in 
the 1960s, was a public sector effort that nevertheless played a key role in opening up developing 
country agriculture to capitalist investment. Today, global attention is focused on an imperative to 
accelerate agricultural production in Africa. A ‘New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition’, a 
major new US-led initiative which aims to ‘help lift 50 million people in Sub Saharan Africa out of 
poverty in the next 10 years by supporting agricultural development’ was recently launched 
(USAID, n.d.), giving a key role to agri-business corporations. These developments, alongside an 
increasingly high profile presence of the BMGF and other philanthrocapitalists in development 
debates are blurring the boundary between development aid and private investment yet further. It is 
important, therefore, to look beyond the ‘win-win’ rhetoric that surrounds the ‘new philanthropy’ 
and its defining role in global development: to critically examine the design and operation of 
philanthropic ventures in practice and ask who will be the winners and losers in the long term.  
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